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The regulation of inheritance law on the basis of the 
essential personal or social conditions always appears to 
be a reflection of the various opinions of an age, which 
are shaped by national character, its cultural level, and 
economic considerations. 
Heinrich Ahrens (1871, 249) 
1.1. Inheritance and Modern Society 
Everyone who dies leaves something behind. Everyone who owns property 
leaves it behind. But to whom does this property belong? All societies that 
recognize individual property rights need rules to reallocate property upon 
the owner’s death. In modern societies, a codified inheritance law defines 
the rights of the testator to dispose of his or her property by will, the rights 
of the deceased’s family members, and the rights of the state to appropriate 
all or part of the property. But societies regulate these issues in different ways. 
How to regulate them became a major topic of intense political, legal, eco­
nomic, sociological, and philosophical debate in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. For Alexis de Tocqueville the question of inheritance was so 
important to a society’s development that when “the legislator has once 
regulated the law of inheritance, he may rest from his labor” (1980 [1835], 
1:48). John Stuart Mill (1968 [1848], 202–3) saw inheritance law as the 
most critical area of law, equaled in significance only by contract law and 
the status of laborers. 
The present book explores the development of inheritance law in Ger­
many, France, and the United States since the late eighteenth century. By 
examining four central controversies over inheritance law during these three 
centuries, I try to explain how inheritance law developed and why differ­
ences exist to this day between the legal systems of these three countries. 
The four areas of conflict are (1) the degree of testamentary freedom; (2) the 
legal rights of the testator’s relatives, especially his or her spouse and chil­
dren; (3) entails; and (4) inheritance taxation. Why is the testator allowed 
only minimal testamentary freedom in France, while that freedom is almost 
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unlimited in the United States? Why did the principle of real partitioning 
come to prevail in France? Why do family interests play a much more im­
portant role in German inheritance law than in American inheritance law? 
Why, in all three countries, was inheritance taxation introduced or funda­
mentally reformed in the early twentieth century? Why were much higher 
estate taxes introduced in the United States than in Germany? Why were 
entails banned in Germany only in 1919, 140 years later than in the United 
States and 70 years later than in France? 
Inheritance Law and Social Solidarity 
These questions lie at the heart of the present study. At the same time, its 
analysis is embedded in a comprehensive theoretical framework that owes 
much to Émile Durkheim’s sociology of law (1984, 1992).1 Durkheim ana­
lyzed the development of legal institutions as an aspect of the macrosocial 
evolution of society. He regarded the development of the relationship between 
individuality and the normative structures of society as a major topic for 
the sociological analysis of the process of modernization.2 According to 
Durkheim, the development of the law is an indicator for the relationship 
“of the individual to social solidarity” (1984 [1893], xxx). 
As early as The Division of Labor in Society, but especially in the lec­
tures Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Durkheim applied his view of 
the law to property rights. According to Durkheim (1992 [1957], 146), the 
right of property expresses a direct moral bond between the thing owned 
and the owner. The moral position of the individual is reflected in the legal 
rights of the owner. The violation of property rights is punished because 
society recognizes it as a violation of the owner himself. According to 
Durkheim, the moral status of the individual in relation to the family, to 
intermediary institutions, and to the state is admitted into the rights and 
duties of the disposition of property because of the link between property 
rights and the person. These law-based normative structures of modern 
society become visible through an examination of the historical genesis of 
property law. 
Durkheim touched on inheritance law in the fragmentary book of lec­
tures Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, but his analysis concentrated 
on contract law. Yet it is the study of the development of inheritance law 
that allows us to trace most clearly the structures of the relationship of 
individuality and its social embeddedness. In conflicts over inheritance 
law, questions about the relationship between individual freedom in the 
disposition over property, the claims of the family and the state to this 
property, as well as the role of ascription and individual achievement take 
center stage and provide a concise indicator of the normative structures 
that carry out the social integration of the individual. The close link of 
inheritance law to this question of social integration can also be seen in 
the fact that inheritance as a social problem emerges only when property 
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rights are individualized and a purely family-based understanding of private 
property is transcended. 
The development of modern inheritance law is linked to the dissolution 
of the economic unit of the household, in which there was no right of inhe­
ritance in the modern sense, because the unit itself was considered immor­
tal (Weber 1978 [1922], 1:359). Upon death, a member ceased to be the 
bearer of an idealized “share” of the property, but that did not amount to a 
real transfer of property. According to Max Weber, it was only the processes 
of differentiation through individualized forms of acquisition, the separation 
of household and workplace, the growing significance of capital in relation 
to land as a factor of production, and the institution of dowry that led to 
increasingly calculated internal family relations and to the individualization 
of property rights. This, in turn, contributed to the dissolution of the house­
hold and created the social problem of assigning property mortis causa. 
Thus, the development of inheritance law is intimately linked with processes 
of social differentiation. However, as I want to show, this is not a process of 
individualization, understood as an increasing separation of the individual 
from society, but rather, in the Durkheimian sense, a transformation of 
social solidarity. How individual disposition over property mortis causa is 
embedded in conceptions of social solidarity in the three societies investi­
gated is the subject of the present book. 
Discourse on Inheritance Law and Legal Development 
Although this book follows Durkheim in connecting the examination of the 
evolution of law with the understanding of modernization, my approach is 
different from Durkheim’s: in The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim 
suggested that we consider social reactions to violations of the law as an 
indicator of the development of individuality and social solidarity. For 
Durkheim, the declining importance of criminal law reflected the diminishing 
relevance of “solidarity through likeness” and the increasing crystallization 
of the individual as the moral subject of modern society. The decline of 
the repressive sanctions of criminal law, through which traditional societies 
assure their social cohesion, can be read as a sign of the waning significance 
of collective consciousness. This indicator of moral development, however, 
is unsuitable for inheritance law. From the outset, inheritance law concerns 
mostly questions of civil law—although criminal law plays an indirect 
role with regard to crimes like tax evasion, forgery, or fraud. Moreover, 
Durkheim’s emphasis on the changing reactions to the violation of legal 
provisions leads him to focus on the actual development of the law. However, 
Durkheim’s focus on the examination of the evolution of legal rules is limited 
because it obscures most information about the collective representations 
concerning the transmission of wealth that exist in society. Much of that 
information can only be found through an analysis of the political discourses 
surrounding the reform of inheritance law. 
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As a result, this study is focused largely on the legal and political debates 
on questions of inheritance law. To be sure, some aspects of the relationship 
between the testator’s individual rights of disposal and obligations toward 
his or her family and society can be seen in the development of the law it­
self. Yet the goals of the actors and the arguments for or against certain 
provisions become clear only if one looks at the legal and political dis­
course conducted within the legislative process, and sometimes outside of 
it. The structure of these debates provides insights into the perception of 
causal relationships, the values held by the actors involved, and the struc­
tures of political power and the changes they undergo. The discourses 
reveal different positions along with the fundamentally contentious nature 
of the legal provisions ultimately adopted. I thus follow Durkheim’s insight 
that the development of law can be used as an indicator of macrosocial 
processes of change. At the same time, the inclusion of legal and political 
discourses allows for an expanded study that makes the significance of 
discursive structures accessible for the purpose of studying the develop­
ment of the law. Among other things, including this level of analysis may 
allow different collective representations in the three countries to become 
apparent, representations that might otherwise be hidden behind similar 
legal developments. 
The acceptance of legal regulations, as Durkheim noted, depends on a 
moral core from which they derive their legitimacy. The emphasis on 
linguistic processes of communication points to something else in addition, 
namely the role that a value-oriented formation of political objectives plays 
in the social integration of modern societies. The political sphere is the 
“forum” in which—on the basis of the ideas of social justice and causal 
relationships implicit in a political culture—the legitimacy of rules of law is 
created or contested, a legitimacy that is usually the precondition for the 
political enforceability of these rules, and in every case the basis for their 
practical acceptance. Thus, the examination of legal and political conflicts 
over the institutionalization of inheritance law takes on a double meaning: 
the arguments advanced for or against legal reforms are an indicator of the 
development of ideas about “social solidarity”; at the same time, the moral 
constitution of society is created and reproduced precisely in these discur­
sive processes. 
It is therefore not a question of simply replacing one indicator with 
another, but of advancing Durkheim’s approach on a theoretical level.3 
Durkheim believed that norms derive their validity from religious symbols 
that in turn, derive their significance from collective experiences during 
religious rituals. Jürgen Habermas, in particular, objected that Durkheim’s 
explanation did not adequately recognize the “trend toward the linguistifi­
cation of the sacred” (Habermas 1987, 2:46) and thus the important role 
that linguistically mediated, norm-guided interaction plays in the integration 
of modern societies. Social solidarity is created precisely out of linguistic 
processes of communication (Verständigung) in which actors are forced to 
•  I N T R O D U C T I O N  •  5 
justify their claims about what constitutes appropriate actions within the 
normative context of roles and institutions (1987, 2:56). Habermas thus 
refers to the production of morally binding forces in discourse and rejects 
the idea of a simple imprinting of norms and values in the process of 
socialization. 
While I share Habermas’s assessment of the importance of the role of dis­
course to the normative development of society, the way in which I incor­
porate it into my analysis differs from Habermas. Unlike Habermas, I am 
not concerned with the development of a procedural ethics and with the 
orientation of processes of communication toward claims of universal 
validity and the concepts of secularization that go along with this. The role 
of discourses can also be understood in a very different way. 
In his critique of Durkheim’s sociology of religion, Hans Joas (2000, 
67ff.) pointed out that Durkheim linked processes of institutionalization 
too directly to experiences of collective excitation. What Durkheim’s theory 
of institutions obscures, Joas argued, is that “the individuals who partici­
pate in the collective experience having developed differing interpretations 
of this experience, . . . only then refine into a collective interpretation 
through a process of discussion and argument (a process that is pervaded 
with power)” (2000, 67–68). It is only out of the dynamic of this contingent 
process of dealing with collective experiences—that is, the interpretation of 
causes, reasons, results, and possibilities—that institutions emerge, change, 
and solidify. 
Against this background, I regard discourses on inheritance law as proc­
esses that generate socially recognized viewpoints and thus lay the founda­
tion for the process by which inheritance law becomes institutionalized. 
They are not analyzed as ways of generating universally recognized norms 
of behavior, or as symbolic reflections of the infusion of power into social 
relations. Instead, the goal of my approach is to examine the intersubjective 
and conflictual creation of ideas of justice as well as the conceptions of 
causal relationships and their significance for explaining the development of 
inheritance law. 
Orders of Justification in Inheritance Law 
By explaining the development of inheritance law and how it has differed in 
France, Germany, and the United States, on the one hand, and by examin­
ing the development of the relationship of the individual to society, on the 
other, I am pursuing two goals in this study. These goals are linked by the 
thesis that the development of inheritance law itself cannot be explained 
independent of the discursive structures in each of the three countries. The 
explanation of the development of inheritance law that I am striving for is 
based on a multidimensional heuristic that incorporates economic interests, 
demands by the state, and the role of social institutions (especially the family 
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and the legal system), as well as culturally based values that are expressed 
in the discourse on inheritance law. All of these dimensions are significant 
for each of the four areas of conflict examined here, although different 
elements of explanation are paramount in each area. What emerges, there­
fore, is a complex picture of the development of institutions of inheritance 
law, which depicts this development as dependent on economic, govern­
mental, social, and cultural influences. This multidimensional explanation 
of the development of inheritance law stands close to Max Weber, whose 
theory of institutions was based precisely on the presumed link between 
ideas and interests.4 
The three countries included in this comparative study, Germany, France, 
and the United States, can be seen as part of modern Western capitalism as 
defined by Max Weber. From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth 
centuries, all three countries were undergoing a process of profound social, 
political, and economic transformation. While this development took place 
against the background of different initial conditions, its thrust was essen­
tially the same in all three countries, as a result of which they confronted 
fairly similar functional problems. The selection of Germany, France, and 
the United States is based on this relative similarity, which suggests that 
inheritance law might have developed in parallel ways. 
At the same time, however, the three countries differ in many of the 
values expressed in the debates over how the law should deal with 
“inherited wealth.” The discourses on inheritance law reflect different 
ways in which the moral and political problems posed by inheritance were 
articulated, as well as differences in the consequences the actors ascribed 
to specific rules of inheritance law. I will show that different “guiding 
problems” (Kaufmann 2001) exist in each of the three countries for the 
regulation of inheritance law. These problems form a “discursive field,” 
which is expressed in the justifications offered by actors for their accept­
ance or rejection of proposed institutional reforms. The term discursive 
field is meant to express that while there is no homogeneous point of view 
of inheritance law in each of the three countries, the contending parties 
defend their clashing views with certain dominant patterns of argumenta­
tion that are stable over the long term. Discursive fields establish boundaries 
of discussion and define a spectrum of problems that can be addressed 
(Wuthnow 1989, 13). Discursive fields thus give expression to socially avail­
able systems of meaning, which can provide a basis of legitimizing support 
for, or opposition to, efforts to change inheritance law. Here one can also 
speak of “orders of justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991).5 Discursive 
fields have a binary structure. The stark juxtaposition of binary alternatives 
is a mechanism for simplifying complex contexts, and this simplification 
makes it possible to articulate guidelines for decision making.6 This book 
will examine how these orders of justification differ between Germany, 
France, and the United States, and how—along with economic and political 
aspects—they influence the development of inheritance law. 
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Starting from this multidimensional explanatory approach, my thesis is 
not that the orders of justification expressed in the discursive fields can 
explain the development of inheritance law, but rather that orders of justifi­
cation influence legal development along with other aspects. The specific 
lines of conflict in legal discourse are a cultural element of the public sphere 
that represent one factor of explanation for the evolution of law, alongside 
material interests and functional demands. What makes the discourses rele­
vant to actors is that worldviews are articulated and shaped in them; as 
cultural background, these views then feed into the interpretations of a given 
situation. Moreover, they shape the perceptions of causal relationships, 
thereby contributing to the legitimation or delegitimation of particular 
positions and thus influencing their political chances of being implemented 
(Beckert 2002, 106). One reason such a context can be posited is that the 
successful political implementation of legal reforms is always dependent 
on legitimation, at least when dictatorial coercion is not available. Legal 
reforms that can be legitimated with reference to deep-seated cultural un­
derstandings thus have an “evolutionary advantage,” an advantage that 
should manifest itself in a link between the structure of the discursive field 
and the development of the law. 
The influence of evaluative schemata that are culturally anchored arises 
also from the constitutive, a priori understanding of the actors (Beckert 
2003; Biernacki 1995; Dobbin 1994). The predominant evaluative stan­
dards are related not only to the goals that are considered legitimate, but 
also to the strategies that guide the rational, intentional choice of means 
to achieve the desired ends. The deeper underlying reason is this: because 
complexity and novelty render causal relationships uncertain, a rational 
choice of strategy as defined by economic theory is ruled out and actors 
must resort to the “substitute rationalities” they find in their social environ­
ment (Beckert 1996, 2002). This critical perspective on economic institu­
tionalism emphasizes the importance that the causal relationships as 
asserted by the actors have for the development of institutions. What I 
contend is that the choice of the causal relationships regarded as valid 
from among all the possible relationships between the specific rules of 
inheritance law and their desired or rejected effects is also derived from the 
orders of justification. The intent here is not to deny the existence of objec­
tive causal relations, but to shift attention to the perceptions of these rela­
tionships, which themselves exert an effect on the political process. In this 
sense, as I try to show in this book, “ideas” play a role in the development 
of inheritance law. 
Notions of Property and the Structure of Discourses on Inheritance Law 
The lines of conflict over inheritance law in the three countries are struc­
tured around the question of what kind of intervention in the private 
disposal over property is legitimate. The unlimited power of disposal by 
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testators over their wealth encounters opposition in all three countries. Yet 
actors who plead for intervention in this right resort to specific arguments 
that differ between the three countries, but exhibit a great long-term conti­
nuity within the countries. The phrase “notions of property” refers to the 
primary, specific justifications for restrictions on the unchecked individual 
disposal over private property that appear in the discourses on inheritance 
law in a given country. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen­
turies—in some cases even earlier—these understandings had shaped and 
structured the discourses in the subsequent key phases of the development 
of inheritance law examined in the present study. Some of the argumentative 
patterns that were relevant during the French and American revolutions as 
well as in the political debates on inheritance law conducted at about the 
same time in Germany are still found today. What these arguments consist 
of and how they differ will be described in the main chapters of the book. 
Let me offer a brief characterization of the respective notions of property. 
In the United States, two fears were dominant: first, that a dynastic 
concentration of wealth would destroy the social bases of the republican 
order, and, second, that inheritances would undermine the equality of 
opportunity, a “sacred” principle behind the justification of social inequality. 
These fears were countered by arguments that defended the right to unim­
peded testamentary disposal over wealth as an integral part of private 
property, and by economic arguments that rejected intervention in inheri­
tance law as economically detrimental. 
Germany saw the emergence of very different structures of justification. 
In the nineteenth century, unlimited testamentary freedom was frequently 
seen as a possible cause behind an unbridled individualism (which was 
rejected on normative grounds) and thus as destructive to social relations 
within the family and society. There has been a strong tendency to regard 
property as family property, which makes the legal owner appear as the 
trustee for the estate of the clan; the owner’s death does not lead to a real 
transmission of property. Moreover, in Germany, government interference 
in the individual disposal over private property was legitimated with the 
goal of social justice. This can be traced back to the debates over private 
property in the first part of the nineteenth century, and it still found its way 
into the Basic Law of the Federal Republic as the principle of the social 
obligation of property. One side of the discursive field argued that the 
testamentary freedom of the testator must be limited to protect the family 
and—through inheritance taxation—to generate the funds for a social 
policy aimed at redistributive balance. The point of reference is not equality 
of opportunity, but rather the result-oriented principle of social justice. In 
other words: while the American order of justification takes the individual 
and his or her freedom more strongly as a normative point of reference, in 
Germany the individual is tied more clearly into a familial and social 
context. At the same time, the discursive field in Germany also contains 
liberal economic voices that advocate unrestricted property rights and 
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point to the negative economic consequences of interference in the right of 
inheritance. Against the background of a stronger individualistic perception 
of social integration, they infer a right of inheritance unrestricted by state 
and family. 
In France, one side of the debate has maintained that the state has an 
obligation to the general welfare while maintaining strict neutrality with 
regard to private interests. This is expressed primarily in a dominant refer­
ence to the principle of equality in intestacy law, but also in resistance to 
the progressive taxation of inheritances, and in the attempt to use inheri­
tance laws for the goals of population policy. Ever since the debates on 
inheritance law in the Constituent Assembly, this has been opposed by a 
position that objects to the implementation of the principle of equality by 
the state and instead emphasizes the individual rights of inheritance of the 
testator, which are considered to strengthen the family and avoid the eco­
nomically deleterious consequences of institutionalizing the principle of 
equality—especially the fragmentation of landed property. In contrast to 
the German debates, a significant current of the French discourse has 
argued that the family is endangered precisely by governmental restriction 
on the rights of the testator. In contrast to the United States and Germany, 
in France equality and social justice do not play much of a role with respect 
to individual opportunities or goals of social policy; rather, their main ref­
erence is to the problematic relationship between the state and civil society. 
For the sake of brevity and greater emphasis, I speak of the individualist-
meritocratic understanding of property in the United States, the family-social 
understanding of property in Germany, and the egalitarian/family-based 
understanding of property in France. My intent is not to claim that there is 
a homogeneous perception of property in the respective societies, but to 
characterize the dominant tensions within which inheritance law reforms 
take place. The discursive field is structured cognitively and normatively 
by the respective perceptions of property. In the discourses on inheritance 
law, the justifications for interventions in the individual disposal over 
property can be read as cognitive and evaluative differences between actors 
in the three countries. 
At the same time, the ambiguity of the orders of justification when it 
comes to institutional implementation and the selective reference by actors 
to specific positions within the discursive field produce a potential for 
conflict, since opposing views can find simultaneous legitimizing support. 
The discursive field provides no script for determining concrete rules of 
inheritance law; it merely represents a frame of reference in which actors 
position themselves by using specific justifications for positions in the 
debates. Nor can the orders of justification simply be attributed to a right-
left schema. Instead, the examination of the legal discourse on inheritance 
law and parliamentary debates reveals that actors with different material in­
terests justify their political goals sometimes by invoking the same available 
social patterns of interpretation. In Germany, reference to the principle of 
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family is used both to justify limiting testamentary freedom and introducing 
escheat as an instrument of social policy, and to reject inheritance taxation 
as an illegitimate intervention in family wealth. In France, reference to the 
principle of equality is used both to legitimate restrictions on testamentary 
freedom aimed at more equal property relations and to reject a progressive 
inheritance tax. In Germany, testamentary freedom is seen largely as ad­
vancing an individualism that is hostile to the family, while in France it is 
considered by many as providing protection for the family. 
Outline of the Book 
The core of the book is subdivided into four chapters, each devoted to a 
central area of conflict in inheritance law. The four areas represent the cru­
cial legal and political debates on inheritance law since the late eighteenth 
century. Because the significance of the areas of conflict varies in the three 
countries, the subchapters differ in length. Aspects concerned primarily 
with technical legal questions are not examined. This includes issues having 
to do with the specific form of wills or with international cases of inheri­
tance. All chapters, except for chapter 3, focus on examining the debates on 
these four areas of inheritance law. The analysis centers on legal-theoretical 
as well as economic and sociological writings on inheritance law during the 
last two centuries. This provides insight into the structure of the discursive 
field and how it has changed in each of the three countries. The hermeneutic 
interpretation of this empirical material is supplemented by the quantitative 
analysis of parliamentary debates. It is this analysis that offers the best 
prospect of identifying the dominant lines of conflict in dealing with 
“unearned wealth.” The parliamentary debates are evaluated—as far as 
possible7—in a quantitative content analysis, which helps support the her­
meneutic interpretation. More detailed references to the methodology can 
be found in the appendix. 
The actual development of the law is considered along with the dis­
courses on inheritance law. The analysis will identify to what extent the 
observed changes and the persistent legal differences between the three 
countries can be explained by changing economic and political conditions, 
new social contexts, and the different orders of justification. 
Chapter 2 examines controversies about testamentary freedom. Testa­
mentary freedom is the fundamental legal institution dealing with the 
testator’s right to individual disposal over property. The question of 
testamentary freedom and its limitation in the form of an obligatory share 
for members of the testator’s family was an especially controversial area of 
inheritance law in France and Germany. To what extent do interventions in 
testamentary rights represent illegitimate limitations on the private disposal 
of property? What sort of rights do family members have to the testator’s 
property? The starting conditions in the late eighteenth century varied 
considerably in the three countries. In the United States, which largely took 
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over English inheritance law, testamentary freedom was almost unlimited; 
by contrast, in France shortly after the Revolution, testamentary freedom 
was briefly abolished completely along with the compulsory equal division 
of an estate among the legitimate children of the deceased. During the nine­
teenth century, testamentary freedom in the United States was somewhat 
curtailed, primarily through an expansion of the rights of the surviving 
spouse; in France it was not until the twentieth century that some of the 
restrictions enshrined in the Code Civil after 1804 were loosened. In 
Germany, testamentary freedom was debated in the deliberations surround­
ing the creation of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, and it ran into a widespread mistrust 
of the last will in legal philosophy and politics, for many saw it as an insti­
tution hostile to the family. Chapter 3 examines conflicts about the rights of 
inheritance of family members. Intestacy law, which regulates the distribu­
tion of property in the absence of a valid will, can be understood as a 
system of kinship classification whose development reflects changing claims 
of solidarity within the family system. Who is considered a family member 
to begin with, and in what position does he or she stand to other relatives 
within the kinship arrangement? The chapter examines the development of 
inheritance rights of sons and daughters, first and later-born children, the 
surviving spouse, and illegitimate children. The rights of inheritance of 
adopted children and same-sex life partners are also touched on. The devel­
opment of the legal right of inheritance will be used to show how notions 
of claims of solidarity within family systems have changed, and which gen­
eral lines of development can be seen in them. 
Paradoxically, individual testamentary disposal over property is linked 
with restrictions on individual decision-making. In entails, the subject of 
chapter 4, the testator not only determines the heir, but also decides to 
whom the (landed) wealth must be bequeathed after the death of the heir. 
Thus, the testamentary freedom of the heir is in fact abolished. These provi­
sions were intended to prevent the sale or overindebtedness of noble estates 
and to guarantee the dynastic transmission of wealth by controlling the 
options of the heir. Entails are connected most closely with aristocracies, 
which they support by creating a structural dependence between king and 
nobility. In the eighteenth century, contemporary observers, including 
Adam Smith, were already pointing to the dysfunctional consequences of 
entails for capitalism. While the institution did contribute to the stability of 
the nobility’s economic and political power over the long term, it simulta­
neously impeded economic development. One of the central debates on 
inheritance law in France and Germany revolved around the abolition of 
entails and related legal institutions for perpetuating wealth. In France, 
these conflicts were finally settled at the beginning of the Second Republic; 
in Germany, only with the November Revolution in 1918. In the United 
States, entails were forbidden after the Revolution, but multigenerational 
strategies of bequest could also be pursued by establishing a trust. 
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Chapter 5 looks at the role of the state as heir. The state is involved in 
inheritance through taxation, and possibly also through escheat, the right of 
the state to inherit. This right stipulates that in intestate inheritances, the 
state enters as an heir if the nearest relatives lack a certain degree of kinship 
to the testator.8 Far more significant, however, is the actual taxation of inheri­
tances with which the state appropriates a part of the inherited wealth. In the 
nineteenth century, moderate forms of inheritance tax existed in all three 
countries. In the late nineteenth century, in the context of the expansion of 
state expenses and rising military expenditures, the inheritance or estate tax 
became a contested political issue in Germany, France, and the United States. 
The debates about the inheritance tax revolved, on the one hand, around 
the growing financial needs of the state, and, on the other, around the ques­
tion of fiscal justice and the distribution of wealth. Thus, the relationship 
between individual disposal over private property and the claims of society 
(the state) to a part of the wealth is also at the heart of this debate. In 
France, moreover, inheritance taxation was linked with the goal of boosting 
the birthrate. In the early twentieth century, preferential treatment for fami­
lies with many children when it came to inheritance taxation was supposed 
to boost the number of births. What is controversial about the inheritance 
tax is not only the question of how high it should be and who should be 
taxed, but also which goals may legitimately be pursued with it. Should in­
heritance taxes serve as an instrument to redistribute wealth in society, to 
create greater tax equity, or only to cover state expenses in situations of na­
tional emergency? 
The political and scholarly controversies regarding inheritance law 
extend over the entire period in question. Nonetheless, some periods of 
heightened activity can be readily identified. The debates were most intense 
and virulent in France and the United States during the revolutionary 
period and in all three countries between about 1880 and 1930. Debates on 
testamentary freedom and entail were concentrated in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, but their ramifications extended far into the twentieth 
century. Debates about the equality of women and the improvement of the 
status of adopted and illegitimate children in inheritance law began in the 
middle of the nineteenth and continued until the end of the twentieth cen­
tury. Discussions of inheritance taxation were concentrated between 1880 
and 1935, but keep flaring up later in the individual countries at various 
times. Since the 1970s, the estate tax has become once again an important 
subject of political controversy, especially in the United States. Therefore, 
the arrangement of chapters also follows a chronological order. 
1.2. Social Dimensions of Inheritance Law 
The transmission of property derives its social relevance from the influence 
that inheritances exert on social structures and social relationships. We can 
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Table 1.1 
Social Dimensions of Inheritance Law 
13 
The economy 
System of values 
The state and the political order 
Social and family structure 
distinguish four levels: the normative level, on which the acquisition of 
property is justified in societies guided by the principle of meritocracy; the 
economic level, which deals with the economic consequences of inheritance 
law; the level of social and family structures; and the level dealing with the 
relationship between individual property and the state. 
Inheritance and the Principle of Meritocracy 
On the first level, the inheritance of property touches upon central values of 
bourgeois society: the conception of individual freedom, the meaning of 
obligations of solidarity, the principle of equality, and the role of the princi­
ple of meritocracy. The emancipation of the individual from traditional 
communal relationships as a result of the economic and cultural develop­
ments of modernization led to an understanding of property that had a much 
more pronounced individualistic imprint (Weber 1978 [1922], 1:375ff.). 
That, in turn, gave rise to two contradictory consequences for the institu­
tionalization of inheritance law. First, it seems only consistent that the 
owner can freely determine into whose hands property should pass after his 
or her death. By means of the testament, the “last will,” the testator speci­
fies who will become the owner of the property and what conditions attach 
to this transfer. The disposition mortis causa is an individual’s last act of 
will. However, it creates the problem of how this individual right to testa­
mentary freedom can be reconciled with the interest that the family and 
society have in the transfer of property. The testator might be interested—by 
means of his final disposition—in exercising the greatest possible control 
over the affairs of subsequent generations, and thus curtailing their possi­
bilities of deciding how the property should be used. The living, mean­
while, are interested in restricting the arbitrariness of the last will, thus 
making possible, simultaneously, the individual freedom of disposition on 
the part of the heirs. As Thomas Jefferson’s famous dictum put it: “The 
earth belongs in usufruct to the living.” 
However, the institution of inheritance finds itself in a problematic 
relationship also with the emerging, individual conception of property, 
because it contradicts the meritocratic self-conception of modern societies 
(Beckert 1999a). Inherited property has come to the heir “effortlessly” 
through the death of another person; it was not earned by personal effort. 
The institution of inheritance thus runs counter to the justification of 
unequal distribution of wealth based on individual merit and achievement. 
In one central respect, inheritance perpetuates social privileges independent 
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of achievement, even though bourgeois society defined itself precisely in 
opposition to this practice. How can the “unearned” acquisition of wealth 
be justified within the context of a social order that legitimizes social 
inequalities as the product of different contributions its members make 
through personal achievement? Once legal privileges derived from birth 
and the heritability of offices were abolished, the inheritance of property 
was and is the central institution of social privilege in modern societies that 
is based not on effort, but on birth.9 Critics reject the inheritance of wealth as 
an alien normative practice in societies that are oriented towards the princi­
ples of individualism and achievement. This break with the individualistic 
justification of the distribution of wealth also violates the principle of equal­
ity of opportunity, which asserts that the starting conditions should be as 
equal as possible for all, so that differences in wealth can reflect the actual 
accomplishments of individuals. 
Inheritance and Inequality of Wealth 
Every time one generation succeeds another, the private wealth that exists 
within a society is allocated to new owners through inheritance or gifts. 
Given the large amount of private wealth, enormous sums are bequeathed 
every year. In Germany, the wealth that is currently passed on every year is 
estimated at between €150 and €200 billion; in the United States the 
figure is between $600 and $900 billion (Havens and Schervish 1999; 
Sieweck 2000; Szydlik 1999, 81). However, it is not the size of the wealth 
transfer by inheritance as such that turns it into a socially important institu­
tion. Rather, the issue is how inheritances affect a society’s social inequality, 
the efficient operation of the economy, and the motivation that drives the 
behavior of economic subjects. 
Figure 1.1 shows the current distribution of wealth in the three countries 
that are the subject of this study. This data should be taken with a grain of 
salt, because it is the product of different methods of collection and because 
the numbers on which it is based are not entirely reliable. Still, one can 
detect a general picture, which shows that a small elite owns large shares of 
the available private wealth, while large segments of the population have 
virtually no private wealth at all. In all three countries, the distribution of 
wealth is far more unequal than the distribution of income.10 In 2000, for 
example, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of wealth in the United 
States was 0.80, compared with 0.36 for income distribution. In Germany, 
the Gini coefficient for the distribution of wealth was 0.67, compared with 
0.27 for income distribution. For France the respective figures were 0.73 
for the distribution of wealth and 0.28 for income distribution (Davies 
et al. 2006, 50; OECD Factbook 2006).11 
How important are inheritances to the unequal distribution of wealth? It 
is clear that wealth is acquired not only through individual effort, but also 
through inheritance. However, the question of what share of private wealth 
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Figure 1.1 The distribution of private property 
Note: The data for the United States refers to 1995, for France to 1986, for Germany 
to 1998. 
Sources: Keister 2000; Wolff 2002; Hauser and Stein 2001. 
is derived from inheritances is hotly debated by scholars. In the case of the 
United States, Kotlikoff (1988), using model calculations, concluded that 
80% of wealth was based on inheritance, while Modigliani (1988) posited 
a share of only 20%. This broad divergence is explained by different defini­
tions of what an inheritance is, and what present-day effects on wealth 
come from an inheritance in the past. Kotlikoff includes all wealth transfers 
to children after they reach the age of eighteen, along with the accumulated 
interest after the wealth transfer. Modigliani, by contrast, counts only 
actual bequests and large gifts and uses only the real value of the wealth 
transfer in his calculations. Kessler and Masson (1988) use a different 
approach, asking by what percentage private wealth would be reduced if 
inheritances were confiscated. In a simulation model, their calculations for 
the United States and France show that inheritances account for between 
35 and 40% of private wealth. 
In spite of this broad range of economic calculations, it is clear that 
inheritances account for a substantial share of private wealth. What makes 
this finding sociologically relevant, however, is the effect that inheritances 
have on the distribution of wealth. Here it is evident that inheritances 
contribute substantially to the inequality of wealth within a society. In 
France and the United States, about 60% of the deceased leave behind an 
inheritance (Arrondel, Masson, and Pestieau 1997, 101); in Germany 
about 55% of the population inherits something (Szydlik 1999, 93). But a 
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mere 16% of deaths involving an estate in Germany account for half of the 
inherited wealth (Sieweck 2000, 174). According to a French study based 
on data from 1987 (Arrondel and Laferrère 1994), 51% of the wealth that 
was passed on went to 10% of the heirs, and the top 1% of heirs accounted 
for no less than 19% of inherited wealth. In the United States, approxi­
mately 2% of estates are valued at over one million dollars (Havens and 
Schervish 2003). More than half of the testators who at their death were 
among the richest 1% had themselves received a substantial inheritance at 
an earlier time.12 This means at the same time, however, that the vast 
majority of the population inherits no wealth at all or only an insignificant 
amount. As Arrondel, Masson, and Pestieau have said: “Inheritance is 
probably the main factor of wealth concentration among the richest part 
of the population, and of its intergenerational reproduction” (Arrondel, 
Masson, and Pestieau 1997, 104). Inheritance law is thus of great economic 
importance to the top 20% of the population; for the lower half of the 
population, its relevance is at most indirect, to the extent that it affects the 
distribution of wealth and thus social stratification. 
The Economic Dimension 
Like all codifications dealing with property, the rules of inheritance law 
have a bearing on economic efficiency. Too great a concentration of wealth 
can be just as dysfunctional economically as the dissolution of wealth after 
each generation or the removal of landed property from the market through 
restrictions placed on its sale by inheritance law. Extreme concentrations of 
wealth prevent competition and economic innovation. Real partitioning of 
land, or legal provisions for the equal division of an inheritance, such as 
existed traditionally in various parts of Europe and were introduced in 
France after the Revolution, limit intergenerationally effective strategies for 
the accumulation of wealth. The institutions of real partitioning, of the right 
of succession to an undivided farm estate, of entails, and of primogeniture 
have shaped agricultural structures in very different ways and exerted a last­
ing influence on the development of wealth in various regions (Alston and 
Schapiro 1984; Klippel 1987, 275). In the early phase of industrialization, at 
a time, that is, when joint-stock companies played a minor role, the long-
term cohesion of capital-intensive manufacturing or trading companies also 
depended on the rules of inheritance law. But the preservation of wealth 
through inheritance can have negative consequences when unsuitable heirs 
acquire the capital and run a company into the ground. Inheritances under­
cut the allocation function of the market, because capital is being removed 
from competition (see Hoover 1927). An inefficient allocation also takes 
place through feudal inheritance institutions like family entails, which pre­
vent landed property from being allocated through the market. If land can 
be neither sold nor borrowed against, it cannot be offered as collateral for 
loans and thus cannot be used to create investment capital. 
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This economic importance of inheritance law became the subject of 
controversy and debate in the nineteenth century, especially through the 
incorporation of landed property into the market process with the abolition 
of feudal institutions of inheritance law and the real partitioning of agricul­
tural holdings. The relevance of agricultural landed property declines with 
the growth of industrial labor markets, which open up alternative sources of 
income. The inheritance of a farm plays a reduced economic role on both an 
individual and a macroeconomic level. Still, inherited landed property, espe­
cially in the case of France, can initially remain an important protection 
against impoverishment in the face of frequently interrupted industrial 
employment. The spread of joint-stock corporations whose shares are widely 
held, a setup that separates the functions of management and ownership, 
makes the running of a company largely independent of the ownership struc­
ture. It is not important who owns the joint-stock corporation, nor does it 
matter much that company property is divided among a multitude of anony­
mous owners. The continuous decline of employment in the agricultural 
sector, combined with the spread of wage labor, and the increasing shift of 
national wealth from landed property to more liquid industrial capital cause 
the economic importance of the rules pertaining to the partitioning of an 
inheritance to recede into the background. The economic interest of inheri­
tances is increasingly focused on economic groups like the owners of family 
businesses and the remaining farmers, as well as the private interests of those 
individuals who, as heirs, benefit from the transfer of wealth mortis causa. 
The transfer of the business to the next generation poses a major problem 
especially for closely held enterprises (Bös and Kayser 1996; Breuer 2000). 
Additionally, there is a link between inheritance and economic efficiency 
on the level of the motives that spur individuals to action: the possibility of 
the private bequest of wealth helps to diffuse and maintain the capitalistic 
spirit of acquisitiveness, in that inheritance can provide an important incen­
tive to hard work and thrift.13 However, inheritances can also have exactly 
the opposite effect, in that the inherited property destroys the acquisitive 
drive among the heirs who move into a comfortable, ready-made position in 
life.14 These negative motivational effects of inheritances were invoked espe­
cially by liberal commentators, John Stuart Mill and Andrew Carnegie being 
the best-known examples. One American multimillionaire was quoted in the 
magazine Fortune (29 September 1986) as saying: “How the hell do we 
keep our money from destroying our kids?”15 According to a U.S. study 
(Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1993), the likelihood that someone will 
abandon the labor market is four times as great for heirs with an inheritance 
of at least $150,000 as for heirs who receive less than $25,000.16 
Inheritance and Family 
It would be short-sighted to see only the economic consequences and the 
value-oriented aspects of inheritance laws. The social policy debates over 
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inheritance law were never limited to these dimensions; instead, they also 
addressed the rights of members of the testator’s family to portions of the 
estate, and the conditions under which these rights could be lost. Inheri­
tance law regulates fundamental aspects of familial solidarity, which makes 
it relevant to the long-term stability of social structures (Clignet 1992, 
1995; Kohli 1994). Bequests constitute a material foundation for family 
continuity and thereby contribute to the intergenerational stability of social 
structures (Sussman, Cates, and Smith 1970). 
Transfers of wealth independent of individual achievement allow for the 
intergenerational continuity of social positions, they stabilize spheres of 
affiliation and thus the social structure of society, and they counteract the 
vagaries of success in the marketplace. Precisely because wealth disconnects 
social position from achievement, at least in part, it represents a protective 
mechanism of social belonging (Clignet 1992; Lüscher 2002; Simmel 1992 
[1908], 579ff.). In nineteenth-century Germany this connection is evident 
in the struggle of the nobility against the abolition of entails, which were a 
legal institution that restricted the mechanisms of the market. In the 
United States, Nelson Aldrich (1996) has also emphasized the negative 
link between wealth and market in families of the upper class: old money 
describes a dynastic elite of a few families that are able, by means of inher­
ited wealth, to reproduce their social status independent of their success in 
the marketplace, and who for the most part protect their assets from profli­
gate spending through trusts.17 The elitist justification for this privileged 
position points to contributions to society that are made possible only by 
this kind of material independence. Yet even for the middle class, transfers 
of wealth provide at least a partial buffer against the vagaries of the 
marketplace, which allows a better education, a higher risk tolerance, and 
improved living conditions. On a social level, inheritances help to make 
possible generation-spanning continuities in the sociostructural position of 
families (Levy 1983, 551). 
On an individual level, inheritances—as a form of provisioning—can 
stabilize the material situation of the testator’s family. However, the expec­
tation of an inheritance can also be used by the testator to enforce cross-
generational support within the family. The expectation of inheritance—just 
like gifts made during a person’s lifetime (transfers inter vivos)—can 
promote bonds of solidarity between the generations, though it can also 
cause conflicts. In this way, inheritance law intervenes in the foundations 
of family relationships. It should be noted, though, that as a result of 
rising life expectancy, inheritances from parents, the most important 
source for heirs, generally come to children only when they are in their 
forties and fifties.18 
Rules of inheritance lose importance as ways to provide for one’s 
family especially in the twentieth century, because the spread of labor 
markets and the creation of state-run social security systems increasingly 
take on these functions at the death of a family’s provider (Schröder 1987). 
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The institutionalization of social security and the creation of life insurance in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have made individuals less dependent 
on familial support systems, while labor markets tend to make individuals 
independent from familial wealth as the capital basis for their own employ­
ment. In the process, the macrosociological importance of inheritances shifts 
to their function as factors that stabilize sociostructural continuity or social 
inequality by allowing for the unequal distribution of wealth in society 
through bequests. From a microsociological perspective, the function of the 
institution for the individual heir lies in a material benefit that is acquired 
independent of individual achievement. However, as transfers inter vivos, 
wealth transfers can also provide important material impulses for stabilizing 
the socioeconomic position of children, and thus indirectly for strengthening 
the intergenerational solidarity of the family (Attias-Donfut 1995, 2000; 
Kohli 1997, 1999; Szydlik 2000). This functional aspect of the transfer of 
wealth has attracted the attention of sociologists only in the last few years, 
and it modifies the thesis that modernization weakens the bonds of solidarity 
in generational relationships outside the nuclear family. 
Moreover, inheritances can play a symbolic, identity-creating role in the 
material representation of family descent and continuity (Carrier 1991; 
Langbein 2003). Succession to wealth acquired by one’s ancestors, as well 
as the inheriting of individual objects or real estate classified as valuable in 
the family’s memory, can be experienced by heirs as an obligation toward 
their family background and thus influence the life decisions they make. 
Inheritance and the State 
In addition, inheritance law also determines, primarily through the estate 
tax, the contribution that estates must make to funding the state’s expendi­
tures. The flip side to the creation of social safety nets and to the relative 
loss of importance suffered by familial safety systems lies in the state’s 
heightened need for revenue. The taxation of estates and the introduction 
of escheat contribute to the state’s fiscal income. The private right of 
inheritance is restricted through the compulsory transfer of part of a 
deceased person’s wealth to the state. Beginning in the early nineteenth 
century, we see a debate about the possible use of inheritances to finance 
especially social and educational policies. The initial notion was that rela­
tively low inheritance taxes would already be sufficient to finance these 
policies and thus make it possible to put an end to pauperism. Although 
the expansion of inheritance taxes at the beginning of the twentieth 
century took place, in the final analysis, within the context of financing the 
costs of a military buildup, the idea that inheritance taxes could make a 
substantial contribution to a socially just financing of public expenditures 
remained intact until the 1930s.19 
The imposition of inheritance taxes can serve the goal of bringing about 
an egalitarian distribution of income, or it can be seen as a contribution to 
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tax equity. However, inheritances can also be simply drawn upon pragma­
tically as a source of revenues to finance the tasks assumed by the state. 
Moreover, inheritance taxes affect the support for foundations and other 
charitable organizations through testamentary bequests (Joulfaian 2000). 
Instead of passing substantial portions of their wealth to the state in the 
form of taxes, testators can retain influence over the use of their estates by 
setting up foundations or making gifts to existing ones. Inheritance law thus 
acquires relevance for regulatory policy, and gives rise to controversies over 
fundamental questions concerning the relationship between state power, 
institutions of civil society, and individual disposal over private property. 
The contested discussion about the private transmission of wealth through 
inheritance reveals important aspects of the development of the normative 
structures of modern societies. At the same time, the regulations of inheri­
tance are important to the social and economic development of societies. 
Beginning with the bourgeois revolutions at the end of the eighteenth 
century, the unearned acquisition of wealth through inheritance stood in a 
tense relationship with the central values and functional demands of the 
emerging social order. That is the reason why the inheritance of wealth 
could become an institution that is contested to this day, as is reflected in 
the political and scholarly controversies over private law during the last 
two hundred years. These controversies lay open for the sociologist a fasci­
nating field of research that has hitherto received little attention. 
